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Friday 25 April

Theoretical and Conceptual approaches to CFSP/ESDP (I)

Professor Christopher Hill
London School of Economics

What IR theory has to offer

Four main strands, in all of which the is/ought tension is present:

1. Realism/neo-realism

Possibilities for EU to be a superpower (Blair, Warsaw, Oct 2000)? Irrevocably damaged by Iraq crisis? Civilian superpower a contradiction in terms? Stress in this perspective not just on the need for power and the impact of power politics, but also the degree to which the international system may push or pull the EU in particular directions (geopolitics).

2. Liberal institutionalism

The gains from cooperation *inter se* - the 'politics of scale' (Ginsberg); possibly developing through socialisation and Europeanisation (*infra* Tonra) into common identity and the definition of identical interests; but inward looking, and how far should externalities be factored in?

Moravcsik's theory of Liberal Intergovernmentalism, with its stress on EU decisions through 'bargains' driven by domestic factors, might have some role here, but it is so far more a theory of integration than of international relations.

3. Rationalism/Grotianism

This view would explicitly take into account the EU's place in 'international society' - implying an emphasis on international law and other norms, and on a rule-based multilateralism; the sense of domestic and foreign policy values, if not becoming synonymous, then at least overlapping and converging; the desire to avoid the 'double standards' strategy variously advised by Robert Cooper and Robert Kagan, while accepting that international relations is a special environment requiring prudent conduct based on the need for compromise. Is this the closest match to the EU's current working assumptions on foreign policy?

4. Constructivism (strictly speaking a set of epistemological assumptions more than a single theory)

Role of Europe's past experiences and patrimony in shaping its outlook towards the world; sense of Judaeo-Christian identity? Alternatively, participation in a global, even transnational discourse of human rights and constitutionalism could create/confirm a secular, liberal identity and set of obligations in external policy; cultural explanations always cut two ways: we shall have competing views on 'what is Europe?' 'Whose Europe is it?' and 'what *should* Europe be, in relation to others?'

Whichever approach seems most fruitful, it is difficult to think about EU foreign policy without a theory that incorporates a concept of world as much as it does Europe itself. It may be that in the past the EPC/CFSP have been under-theorised because of lack of fit of integration theories on the

one hand, and a distaste for the apparently power-dominated theories of IR on the other. The middle ground, however, is much more fertile.

Theoretical and Conceptual approaches to CFSP/ESDP (II)

Dr Karen E. Smith
London School of Economics

Increasing attention paid in literature to norms in EU foreign policy. Two main avenues of investigation:

- 1) Role of norms/ideas/values in the foreign policy-making process.
 - a) In line with constructivist approaches, analysis of socialisation processes and the growth of 'we-feeling' (Joergensen, Tonra, etc.).
 - b) Analysis of the legalisation and formalisation of CFSP decision-making processes (M E Smith).
 - c) Role of public opinion and media, and analysis of EU foreign policy 'discourses' (and how widely they are shared) (see works by H Larsen, Mary Martin at Cambridge, H Smith).
 - d) Sources of legitimacy for EU foreign policy, how EU foreign policy is justified: reference to universal rights or EU-specific values (Sjursen)

- 2) Role of norms/ideas/values in the substance of EU foreign policy.
 - a) Conceptualisation of EU as an international actor. Current public debate now re differences between 'Europe' and the US, fuelled by Kagan's assertion that Europeans are from Venus and Americans are from Mars. Also considerable academic work on conceptualising the EU as an international actor. What are the shared values/ideas (if any) that guide EU foreign policy? How are these different from the foreign policies pursued by other actors? How can we characterise the EU? Recent characterisations include: 'gentle power' (Padoa-Schioppa), 'normative power' (Manners), 'multilateral power' (Mowle; ECPR workshop discussions), 'post-modern power' (M Smith, Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet), 'civilian power' (numerous scholars), 'quiet superpower' (Moravcsik), or as an actor pursuing a 'structural foreign policy' (Keukeleiere, Teló). However, this 'soft' side of EU foreign policy has also been critically evaluated, with analyses of the extent to which EU pursues more coercive, self-interested, unilateral strategies.
 - b) Empirical work analysing (and criticising) the EU's pursuit of foreign policy goals: promotion of human rights, of democracy, of regional cooperation, of development (K. Arts, A .Dickson; K E Smith).

Theoretical and Conceptual approaches to CFSP/ESDP (III)

From Integration theory to 'Europeanisation': CFSP's Voyage of the Theoretically Damned

Synopsis of Remarks by
Dr Ben Tonra
Academic Director of the Dublin European Institute, UCD

Thanks

10-12 minutes - integration theory and Europeanization vis a vis EU foreign security and defence policy

1 Intro Theory and significance

Expectation that FORNET can assist in reconciling theory with practice - to help us avoid twin pitfalls:

Practitioners' tendency to overlook theory - to have little relevance to the real world - except we know that practitioners apply theory even if unconsciously - their assumptions about the way in which the world works can delimit the range of choices and define the policy realm. We must think about how practitioners think - give them space to reflect

Academics' weakness is that can tend to obsess about theory - creating fetishes and fashions in theory which then dismiss contrary real world evidence as epiphenomenal. We must relate theory with practice if we are make sense of defined realities faced by policymakers and publics

2 CFSP/ESDP as Theoretical Puzzle - matching theory with practice especially tough

Empirical Development - even in long term significant - starting where we did

Bureaucratic structure
Substantive policy remit- especially in light of elision between defense/security and CFSP/security
Decision making capacity

Traditional Integration Theories and Challenge of Practice:

Security and defence - the realist sanctus sanctorum and the neo-functionalist Waterloo (albeit both rationalised defeat by highlighting 'specialness' of EUFSDP)

- A) Security and defence a zero-sum calculation thus not open to mutual gains bargains
- B) Impervious to spillover

CFSP is functionally deeper, substantively broader, more institutionalised and more collective in scope (if not yet 'common') than might reasonably have been foreseen by realist rationalist and liberal rationalist accounts especially post 1998

Theoretical Response to St Malo and after... Jolyon Howarth on empirics

Neofunctionalists - not a surprise at all but ultimate testament to power of spillover (earlier explanations of CFSP exceptionalism not withstanding!)

LI realists - state gains from cooperation - some invisible (and previously unforeseen) tipping point in absolute/relative gains debate - what convincing explanation

BUT - security and defence no longer 'special' ???! - Hanna Ojanen

Options:

1. CFSP/ESDP no longer 'high politics' - where concerned with survival of state faced with overwhelming security threat but a broader area of securitising - peacekeeping, conflict prevention, collective security functions with less sovereignty-focus - just another national policy open to supranationalisation - balancing against US (as in trade/econ wars)
2. bandwagoning - against the US ERRF capacity as subset of NATO. Division of labour.
3. MLG - Ok for managing butter mountains not for organising war cf Chris Hill?

If Security and Defence is still special - what makes it so... identity

Attraction of Europeanisation: A conceptual framework that can assist us in understanding impact of CFSP/ESDP on national FPs of a policy that is common among states rather than single for a (proto) state. Also allows focus on collective outputs (EU + MS)

New questions opened:

CFSP's impact on national foreign policy - doing the pomo identity shuffle or real policy implications - relating interests and identities, values, beliefs etc - normative bases (Helen Sjursen and ECPR)?

Accept - rejoice - in EFSDP limitations - build on positive rather than bemoan the gaps - or worse ad hoc fill ins!

Tectonic metaphor; extensions of norms - strengthening layer over layer with time - but don't expect this to prevent earthquakes!

Saturday 26 April
CFSP and enlargement: problems of mutual adaptation (I)

Dr Hanna Ojanen
Finnish Institute of International Affairs

My presentation is divided roughly in three parts. I will start with a brief look at what we in general terms know about the relationship between the CFSP and enlargement: whether there is any accumulated knowledge on that. I'll also look at some of the earlier experiences in this respect. Then, I'll go to analysing what is actually new and peculiar with next year's enlargement, and finally, I conclude with some considerations about how to make the process of mutual adaptation as smooth as possible.

I Basic constants about the impact of enlargement on CFSP (if any)

What do we know in general terms about enlargement and EU foreign and security policy? We might not have any general theories about it. To my knowledge, there is no 'enlargement theory'. Enlargement might be one of the under-theorised fields of integration studies, and this might have to do mainly with the fact that enlargement is seen as an exceptional condition, a period of turbulence, that by definition is not easy to theorise about. Yet, rather than an exceptional condition, enlargement is actually one of the most permanent features of the EU. The first membership applications arrived in 1961, and the Community/Union has then enlarged in 1973, 1981, 1986, 1990 (Eastern part of Germany) and 1995. Thus, it has always been receiving new applications, carrying out membership negotiations, or adjusting to the new arrivals - and this actually makes enlargement a permanent condition of the Union.

What we do seem to know in general terms about enlargement is that it often leads to reform, that there is a relation between widening and deepening. This positive relationship is also visible as regards enlargement and the CFSP.

Not everything is positive: we could immediately list a couple of problems caused by increasing number of member states: decision-making becomes more complicated, and foreign political preferences more varied and hard to bring together. Yet, enlargement also means more resources, and more international weight.

Yet, it is generally difficult to know about the foreign policy preferences of the newcomers before they actually become members (during the negotiations, they would have a low profile and stress the perfect compatibility between the CFSP and their national policies). Moreover, even the other side of the negotiations has a rather unclear image: there is only a vague picture of what CFSP/ESDP actually is - or, today's member states might have different views on what it is and where it is going.

Thus, while our starting point might be that there has to be mutual adaptation, there are uncertainties on both sides: what is adapting to what?

As to the newcomers, we tend to base our hopes on the process of socialisation - whatever that might be in practice - that in time renders the new members increasingly similar to the old ones in their views and interests. But at the same time, the Union should be sociable with the newcomers, and take their views into account.

Rather than giving space for the newcomers and welcoming them, the Union might actually take conservative measures, aimed at resisting (certain kind of) change, at conserving, keeping the *acquis*. In practice, that would mean keeping the position of the old members, and their ideas, intact. One example is the attempt at making deals and agreements *before* the new ones enter. The Union protects itself by requiring more and more from the applicants, and by changing decision-making to decrease their say once they are members. These kinds of measures are understandably likely to lead to suspicions, and we might even need to question whether that kind of a Union still can count on the newcomers' socialisation.

Thus, for the Union, a central question is also whether all the *acquis* is really worth conserving.

Instead of mutual adaptation, one might also sketch a bad scenario: that of the Union and the newcomers mutually ignoring, evading each other. Signs of this kind of development would be, e.g., that the old members proceed with the ESDP in a small clique, quickly, and telling the newcomers to 'shut up', while the new countries would not even see any point in following them but would instead reinforce their NATO orientation.

II earlier experience

If we take a rapid look at what has been the record thus far, we can see that enlargement has greatly benefited the CFSP.

One could argue that the EPC itself started partly because of enlargement. The Hague summit of 1969 decided on its start; in the waiting room, there were countries that wanted to join that were problematic as to foreign policy: neutral Ireland, US-minded UK, and UK-minded Denmark - none of them wanting the EC to become a security political actor.

The year Greece joined, 1981, the London report introduced, e.g., the troika system to make presidencies stronger and assure continuity in foreign policy. Yet, these changes in the presidency can also be seen as signs of a lack of trust, as when, later on, presidencies were put in a new rotating order, to minimise problems caused by having one after another several 'problematic' countries, that is, small, new and non-aligned.

The following enlargement coincided in 1986 with the Single European Act, and then, in the 1990s, the ex-neutral or non-aligned countries' applications might well have been one reason for CFSP, the pompous wording of the Maastricht Treaty. They were seen as a threat for the idea of a common security policy. (At least when looking at the Finnish experience, Finland was indeed a foreign political problem for many other members, in particular because of the risk of bloc formation, the Nordic countries together with Germany, or the non-aligned, with Austria. Indeed, a specific declaration about loyalty to the CFSP was needed (in December 2003)).

Thus, One could even argue that enlargement is one of the main motivations behind the development of the CFSP. But as serious academics, we might still want to avoid calling this a theory, and say that it is one coincidence after another, or a series of coincidences.

III Novelties today

What makes, then, next years' enlargement round particular? I'll leave aside the usual remark that there are many new members at the same time and that they have a particular history as part of the Eastern bloc, that they are different from the earlier candidate states.

It is important to note that also the EU is to some extent new. At least four novelties could be listed. There is the Convention, working on a EU constitution; there are new EU-NATO relations; there is a split between members as to US action in Iraq, and, finally, there are new neighbours to come.

In the end, however, these novelties might actually not be that new. First, the split is not entirely new. There has always been a split in Europe and in the EU between 'Europeanists' and 'Atlanticists'. What are new are rather the uncertainties around the position of the United States: what side does it take?

Secondly, the new neighbours are not that new, either. It is usual that enlargement brings with it new neighbours for the EU. When Greece joined, these were Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Turkey; with Austria came the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Hungary and Slovakia, and when Finland joined, Russia became a new neighbour.

They were perhaps not talked about as 'new neighbours', though. What is new, therefore, is not new neighbours *per se* but rather the realisation that there has to be something called 'neighbourhood policy'. The EU, because of its economic and political importance and attractiveness, is expected to have its own permanent relations with its neighbours.

The new neighbours to come are Belarus, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia, and Croatia; later Moldova, Macedonia, Albania, Georgia, Armenia, and with Turkey's membership, Iran, Iraq and Syria.

In this policy field, the EU does seem to need new ideas and approaches, and there, the experience of the incoming new members will be particularly important. Again, the new members might also want to redirect some of the existing neighbourhood policies. There have been indications of a possible change in EU-Russia relations, for example.

As to the other novelties of this round, the Convention and EU-NATO relations, the crucial question is the contents of the ESDP, and what the S and the D mean there. Some maintain that this is the right time for steps towards common defence - and thus, enlargement would once again be a main, though perhaps implicit, motivation.

EU-NATO relations, in a way, seem to be a competition for souls. On the surface, the new members seem to see NATO as the important hard security provider, and rely on NATO, as the EU is too weak and unimportant in this field. On the other hand, the EU might be winning the 'competition' between the two organisations, for two reasons. First, there is a basic difference between the EU and NATO which has an impact on their development and future: NATO lacks the EU's internal development dynamics. In NATO, widening is not accompanied by deepening. There are, in other words, fewer mechanisms to protect NATO from the negative impact of enlargement. Second, when, moreover, the US is willing to give more financial and military responsibility to the Europeans as regards European security, the EU seems really to have new space to develop the ESDP - a concrete example being the first EU-led operations in Macedonia and Bosnia, inherited from NATO.

This would be a temptation for the EU to advance even more quickly towards enhanced military capabilities. So, next years' enlargement resembles the previous ones in that there is the usual temptation to take bold steps ahead - but also the parallel risk of making some members angry and frustrating the newcomers.

IV To conclude:

To conclude, enlargement does present a dilemma for the Union. It is disruptive. It has even been said that an entity that continuously grows can never become a coherent foreign policy actor. But, at the same time, it is one of the best things for the Union, and this for three reasons. First, enlargement is a proof of the attractiveness of the organisation, thus, of great value for the self-perception of the organisation. Second, enlargement might be the most effective foreign policy tool the EU has, at least as regards the spreading of norms - the EU's 'normative power', but also as to conflict prevention, by helping to make the neighbours more stable and more prosperous. A third reason, then, might be the positive influence enlargement has on the CFSP.

But how to avoid the bad scenario of mutual evasion rather than mutual adaptation?

The question is how to make the new members commit themselves to common policies. This is best done, it would seem, by making them feel that they can influence, that they can profit. And the Union should perhaps not try to change so many things at once. Slow motion might be safer. Here, some 'conservatism' might in other words be helpful: by keeping some classical elements intact - such as the rotating presidency - the Union could more easily gain acceptance for some novelties, such as, e.g., the solidarity clause.

CFSP and enlargement: problems of mutual adaptation (II)

Professor Hanspeter Neuhold
University of Vienna

Conclusions of a FORNET conference on enlargement and the CFSP at the Diplomatic Academy Vienna in March 2003

1. The new EU member states from central and east central Europe have no problems accepting the CFSP and ESDP *acquis*.
2. These countries support further integration in general, but have reservations about some 2nd pillar issues like the extension of QMD or the inclusion of a mutual security guarantee in the TEU.
3. They want their priorities to be seen as opportunities for the Union, with Poland emerging as the only new member with global ambitions in the CFSP area.
4. The newcomers will contribute mainly "soft resources", such as expertise and political contacts to the CFSP.
5. They will join the EU with "clean hands" after settling their open disputes with neighbouring countries.
6. The next round of enlargement of the Union will have considerable geopolitical consequences.
7. The undeniable political problems resulting from enlargement, notable the dilemma between the "Atlantic" and "European" orientation of new member states must not be swept under the rug.
8. Enlargement will only strengthen the EU if it can maintain economic growth and political cohesion.